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Avoiding dangerous climate change requires ambitious emissions reduction. Scientists
agree on this, but policy-makers and citizens do not. This discrepancy can be partly
attributed to faulty mental models, which cause individuals to misunderstand the
carbon dioxide (CO2) system. For example, in the Climate Stabilization Task (hereafter,
“CST”) (Sterman and Booth-Sweeney, 2007), individuals systematically underestimate
the emissions reduction required to stabilize atmospheric CO2 levels, which may lead
them to endorse ineffective “wait-and-see” climate policies. Thus far, interventions to
correct faulty mental models in the CST have failed to produce robust improvements
in decision-making. Here, in the first study to test a group-based intervention, we
found that success rates on the CST markedly increased after participants deliberated
with peers in a group discussion. The group discussion served to invalidate the faulty
reasoning strategies used by some individual group members, thus increasing the
proportion of group members who possessed the correct mental model of the CO2
system. Our findings suggest that policy-making and public education would benefit
from group-based practices.
Keywords: climate stabilization task, mental models, group decision-making, carbon dioxide accumulation,
stock-flow tasks, emissions reduction
INTRODUCTION
To avoid dangerous climate change, average global temperature must not exceed a
critical threshold, defined in the Paris Agreement as 1.5–2◦C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC,
2015). However, countries’ current climate pledges are guaranteed to overshoot this threshold
(Mauritsen and Pincus, 2017), indicating that current national emissions policies are grossly
inadequate. In a democracy, implementing effective mitigation policy is a two-step challenge:
policy-makers must craft appropriate policies and those policies must then receive political and
electoral support (Dreyer et al., 2015). Both steps require policy-makers, politicians, and citizens to
understand the CO2 system. Unfortunately, most individuals lack this knowledge and consequently
underestimate themeasures required tomitigate climate change (e.g., Sterman and Booth-Sweeney,
2002; Martin, 2008; Guy et al., 2013).
To reason about emissions policy (in the context of mitigating climate change), an individual
must understand how CO2 emissions contribute to climate change. For example, someone who
accepts the scientific consensus would: (1) recognize that global temperature is increasing, (2)
attribute that increase to human CO2 emissions, and (3) predict that emitting more CO2 will
further increase temperature. This knowledge structure is called a “mental model” (Sterman,
1994; Doyle and Ford, 1998). A mental model represents the causal relationships within a system,
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and is used to describe, explain, and predict system behavior
(Sterman, 1994; Doyle and Ford, 1998). Although crucial for
decision-making, mental models are constrained by cognitive
limits (Doyle and Ford, 1998; Sterman and Booth-Sweeney, 2002)
and can never represent the full complexity of the real world. The
human decision-maker is thus likely to make imperfect decisions
about complex problems.
The Climate Stabilization Task (hereafter, “CST”) represents
the complex problem of choosing the appropriate level of climate
change mitigation. The CST is a decision-making task in which
participants are told that atmospheric CO2 concentration is
increased by CO2 emissions (largely from human activities),
decreased by CO2 absorption (largely by oceans and plants),
and stabilized when the rate of CO2 emissions equals the rate
of CO2 absorption. Participants are also told that atmospheric
CO2 concentration has increased since the Industrial Revolution,
because the rate of CO2 emissions has increased to double the
rate of CO2 absorption. Participants are then presented with a
hypothetical scenario (Figure 1A) in which atmospheric CO2
concentration gradually rises to 400 ppm, then stabilizes by the
year 2100. Next, participants must sketch trajectories of CO2
emissions and CO2 absorption that would correspond with this
hypothetical scenario (Figure 1B).
The “principle of accumulation” states that, at any given time,
the level of some accumulating stock (in this case, atmospheric
CO2 concentration) is the difference between its inflow (rate of
CO2 emissions) and outflow (rate of CO2 absorption) (Martin,
2008). Thus, to stabilize atmospheric CO2 concentration, the
rate of CO2 emissions must decrease to equal the rate of CO2
absorption. However, participants often erroneously assert that
stabilizing CO2 emissions is sufficient to stabilize atmospheric
CO2 concentration (Figure 1C). Known as “pattern-matching,”
this occurs when participants ignore CO2 absorption, believing
that the pattern of atmospheric CO2 concentration should
“match” the pattern of CO2 emissions. Repeated studies find that
only 6–44% of participants answer the CST correctly, with many
falling prey to the above mentioned pattern-matching heuristic
(Sterman and Booth-Sweeney, 2002, 2007; Moxnes and Saysel,
2009; Boschetti et al., 2012; Guy et al., 2013; Newell et al.,
2015). Low success rates on the CST are observed not only for
members of the general public (Boschetti et al., 2012), but also
for individuals who are a good proxy for policy-makers—namely
stakeholders of a project researching climate change impacts
(Boschetti et al., 2012) and Masters students studying system
dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Sterman
and Booth-Sweeney, 2002).
Most interventions to correct decision-makers’ mental models
of the CO2 system—as indexed by responses on the CST—have
been unsuccessful (e.g., Pala and Vennix, 2005; Reichert et al.,
2015). Using analogies (e.g., a bathtub in which the water level
represents atmospheric CO2 concentration) (Moxnes and Saysel,
2009; Guy et al., 2013; Newell et al., 2015) and promoting “global
thinking” over “local thinking” (Fischer and Gonzalez, 2015;
Weinhardt et al., 2015) have produced minor improvements in
CST performance. A formal university course in system dynamics
was more successful (Pala and Vennix, 2005; Sterman, 2010), but
this intervention is too resource-intensive to be applied on a large
FIGURE 1 | Graphical illustration of the CST. Participants are presented with
the graph in (A) showing the increase of atmospheric CO2 concentration since
the year 1900 up until the year 2000. Following 2000, the graph depicts a
hypothetical scenario in which atmospheric CO2 concentration increases to
400ppm before stabilizing by the year 2100. Next, participants are presented
with the graph in (B) and asked to sketch the trajectories of CO2 emissions
and CO2 absorption from years 2000 to 2100 that they believe would be
consistent with the hypothetical scenario. The graph in (C) shows a typical
participant’s response to the CST, where the blue line represents the
participant’s estimate of CO2 absorption, and the purple line represents the
participant’s estimate of CO2 emissions. As the rate of CO2 emissions
exceeds the rate of CO2 absorption, atmospheric CO2 concentration will
increase, not stabilize. This is an example of the so-called “pattern-matching”
heuristic, whereby the pattern of CO2 emissions is assumed to “match” the
pattern of atmospheric CO2 concentration. The correct CO2 emissions
trajectory, given the participant’s estimate of CO2 absorption, is depicted by
the dashed yellow line. The rate of CO2 emissions decreases to equal the rate
of CO2 absorption, an equilibrium that would stabilize atmospheric CO2
concentration. This response is consistent with the principle of accumulation,
which states that the level of a stock at any given time is the difference
between its inflow and its outflow.
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scale. Although these results seem discouraging, all interventions
so far share the limitation of characterizing decision-makers as
individuals. However, real-world decision-making is a social,
group-based process informed by the beliefs of others (Tranter,
2011). Previous research shows that groups are better able than
individuals to attenuate cognitive biases and decision heuristics
(Kugler et al., 2012; Schulze and Newell, 2016), as well as identify,
evaluate, and resolve competing hypotheses (Trouche et al., 2015;
Larrick, 2016). These benefits notwithstanding, it is important
to note that groups do not outperform individuals in all tasks.
However, groups do perform consistently better than individuals
on intellective, “truth-wins” problems in which the sole correct
answer can be determined through logic, and then explained to
convince others (i.e., the truth “wins”) (Davis, 1973; Laughlin
et al., 2006). The CST is one such problem, as understanding
the principle of accumulation leads to only one demonstrably
correct solution (i.e., the rate of emissions equaling the rate of
absorption).
The aim of the current study was to test whether an
intervention involving group decision-making can improve
performance on the CST. To address this question, we
administered a computerized version of the CST to staff and
students from the University of Western Australia (N = 141).
Participants were given background information about the CO2
system, and then presented with the hypothetical scenario in
which atmospheric CO2 concentration stabilizes by the year 2100
(Figure 1A). The decision-making component was administered
at two time points, Time 1 (T1) and Time 2 (T2). At T1,
participants were presented with four graphs (Figure 2) and
asked to select the graph that would produce the hypothetical
scenario described. After selecting a graph, participants typed
a brief explanation for their decision. At T2, participants were
randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions,
before entering an anonymized online chatroom for 10minutes.
In the individuals condition (N = 21), participants reflected
on their initial answer and explanation by themselves before
making a decision about the four graphs again. In the dyads
(N = 40) and groups (N = 80) conditions, either two or four
participants, respectively, inspected each other’s initial answers
and explanations, then engaged in a discussion to reach a
consensus decision on which of the four graphs is correct.
There were three key predictions. Firstly, it was predicted
that the individual reflection would have no effect on decision-
making, such that the success rates of individuals would not
increase from T1 to T2. Secondly, it was predicted that the
dyad discussion would benefit decision-making, such that the
success rates of dyads would increase from T1 to T2. Thirdly, it
was predicted that the group discussion would benefit decision-
making to a greater extent than the dyad discussion, such that
the success rates of groups would increase from T1 to T2, and
this increase would be greater than that observed for dyads.
A secondary aim of the current study was to examine whether
individual performance on the CST can be explained by a
person’s (1) demographic characteristics, (2) climate change
knowledge and attitudes, and/or (3) personality and cognitive
style. These constructs influence performance on comparable
tasks that tap similar reasoning skills, but their effects on CST
performance are unclear. Participants therefore completed a
pre-test questionnaire assessing several individual differences
measures. This was an exploratory feature of the current
study and accordingly we made no specific predictions about
the relationships between the following variables and CST
performance.
Most studies find no relationship between demographic
variables and performance on tasks similar to the CST (e.g.,
Moxnes and Saysel, 2004; Sterman, 2008). However, other studies
find that younger participants (Browne and Compston, 2015),
males (Ossimitz, 2002; Browne and Compston, 2015; Reichert
et al., 2015), or students studying STEM degrees (Booth-Sweeney
and Sterman, 2000; Browne and Compston, 2015) perform better
than older participants, females, or students studying non-STEM
degrees. Age, sex, and field of education were therefore included
in the questionnaire.
The questionnaire also included a measure of “climate change
knowledge,” as task-specific knowledge is associated with better
performance on some stock-flow tasks (Strohhecker andGrößler,
2013), but appears unrelated to performance on the CST (Moxnes
and Saysel, 2004). A measure of “climate change attitudes” was
also included to rule out the possibility that participants choose
a graph based on their own ideology, rather than stock-flow
reasoning. For the same reason, a measure of “environmental
worldview,” or one’s beliefs about humanity’s relationship with
nature (Price et al., 2014), was also included.
Two personality variables are related to the ability to overcome
bias by prior belief (Homan et al., 2008; West et al., 2008),
and may therefore benefit performance on the CST. “Active
open-mindedness” describes an individual’s tendency to spend
sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider
new evidence and the beliefs of others (Haran et al., 2013).
“Need for cognition” is the psychological need to structure the
world in meaningful and integrated ways, and is associated with
expending greater mental effort and enjoying analytical activity
(Cacioppo and Petty, 1982).
Lastly, three aspects of cognitive style may be relevant to
task performance. “Cognitive reflection” is the ability to resist
reporting the first answer that comes to mind (Frederick, 2005),
and may therefore protect against pattern-matching. “Global
processing” is a way of perceiving the world that favors the
organized whole, whereas “local processing” favors component
parts and details (Weinhardt et al., 2015). Previous studies
have produced conflicting results on the relationship between
processing style and stock-flow reasoning (Fischer and Gonzalez,
2015; Weinhardt et al., 2015). “Systems thinking” refers to the
tendency to understand phenomena as emerging from complex,
dynamic, and nested systems (Thibodeau et al., 2016). It is
positively related to the ability to comprehend causal complexity
and dynamic relationships (Thibodeau et al., 2016), as well as
pro-environmental attitudes (Davis and Stroink, 2016; Lezak and
Thibodeau, 2016).
A third and final aim relates to Sterman’s (2008) contention
that the widespread, global preference for “wait-and-see”
or “go-slow” approaches to emissions reduction can be
linked to misunderstanding the complex CO2 system. We
therefore included a policy preference question in the pre-test
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FIGURE 2 | The four response alternatives in the multiple-choice version of the CST. All graphs show the same CO2 absorption trajectory with a different CO2
emissions trajectory. Graph (A) depicts the typical pattern-matching response in which CO2 emissions rise and then stabilize. Graph (B) is a less obvious form of
pattern-matching in which CO2 emissions immediately stabilize. Graph (C) approximates the correct answer as CO2 emissions decrease, but not to the level required
to achieve stabilization. Graph (D) is the correct response, because CO2 emissions decrease to equal CO2 absorption, thus stabilizing atmospheric CO2.
questionnaire, which was subsequently repeated at post-test,
after completion of the CST. Participants answered the question,
“Which of these comes closest to your view on how we should
address climate change?” with one of three options: “wait-and-
see” (wait until we are sure that climate change is really a problem
before taking significant economic action), “go-slow” (we should
take low-cost action as climate change effects will be gradual),
or “act-now” (climate change is a serious and pressing problem
that requires significant action now). If poor understanding of
the climate system is indeed responsible for complacent attitudes
toward emissions reduction, then we expect participants who
answer the CST incorrectly to be more likely to prefer “wait-
and-see” or “go-slow” policies at post-test. Conversely, those who
answer the CST correctly should be more likely to select the
“act-now” option.
METHOD
Ethical approval to conduct the experiment was granted by the
Human Ethics Office at the University of Western Australia
(UWA) (RA/4/1/6298).
Participants
One hundred and forty one members of the campus community
at the UWA were recruited to take part in the experiment
using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
(ORSEE; Greiner, 2015), an open-source web-based recruitment
platform for running decision-making experiments. The ORSEE
database at UWA contains a pool of over 1,500 staff and students
from a range of academic disciplines. Participants were recruited
by issuing electronic invitations to randomly selected individuals
in the ORSEE database to attend one of several advertised
experimental sessions. Participants’ ages ranged from 17 to 74
(Mdn = 21.00, M = 23.80, SD = 7.34) and just over two
thirds of participants were female (69.5%). About half studied
a degree-specific major under the Faculty of Science (54.5%),
but the Business School (15.7%), Engineering, Computing, and
Mathematics (14.2%), and Arts (13.4%) faculties were also well
represented. Participants were paid $10AUD for attending the
experiment.
Design
The experiment manipulated two independent variables: group
size (individuals [n= 1] vs. dyads [n= 2] vs. groups [n= 4]) and
time (T1 vs. T2). Group size was a between-participants variable,
whereas time was a within-participants variable. Participants
were allocated to the different group size conditions in a quasi-
random fashion (see below). There was a minimum of 20 cases
per group size: 21 × 1 = 21 participants in the individuals
condition; 20 × 2 = 40 participants in the dyads condition; and
20× 4= 80 participants in the groups condition.
Apparatus, Materials, and Procedure
The experiment was conducted between May and August
2016 in the Behavioral Economics Laboratory at the UWA
(http://bel-uwa.github.io), a computerized laboratory designed
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for carrying out collective decision-making experiments. There
were 27 experimental sessions in total, with a minimum of two
and a maximum of eight participants per session. Group sizes
were randomly pre-determined before each session but were
subject to change in the event that some participants failed to
attend. For example, if eight participants were invited to a session,
the goal was often to run two groups of four participants. If
however, only six participants attended, then four participants
were allocated to the group condition, and two participants
were allocated at random either to the dyads condition or the
individuals condition.
As participants arrived to each experimental session, they
were randomly seated at a workstation containing two computer
terminals. This random seating allocation in turn determined
the group size condition to which the participants were
allocated. The workstations were separated from each other
by privacy blinds to prevent participants from observing one
another’s responses, and participants knew that face-to-face
communication was prohibited. Participants read an information
sheet and provided written informed consent, after which the
experimenter provided an overview of the structure of the
session. Using the left computer terminal on their workstation,
the participants then completed the individual differences
questionnaire (see Supplementary Materials, Section Individual
Differences Questionnaire), which was executed on an internet
browser using Qualtrics survey software. The questionnaire took
approximately 20minutes to complete.
Once all participants had completed the questionnaire,
they received verbal instructions from the experimenter to
minimize their internet browser, which revealed the electronic
instructions for the CST (see Supplementary Materials, Section
Instructions for CST). The first page foreshadowed what the
task would involve. The second page defined CO2, CO2
emissions, atmospheric CO2 concentration, and CO2 absorption.
The third page described how CO2 emissions and CO2
absorption, respectively, increase and decrease atmospheric
CO2 concentration, and why atmospheric CO2 concentration
has increased since the Industrial Revolution. The final
page presented the decision-making situation. It described a
hypothetical scenario in which atmospheric concentration rises
from its current level of 400 ppm to stabilize at 420 ppm by the
year 2100. Participants were then confronted with four graphs
depicting the same trajectory of CO2 absorption, but different
trajectories of CO2 emissions (Figure 2), and were required to
choose the graph that would give rise to the hypothetical scenario.
Graph D (Figure 2D) is the correct response, as it is the only
graph that depicts the rate of CO2 emissions decreasing to equal
the rate of CO2 absorption. We used a multiple-choice format
because it is less cognitively-taxing than the version of the CST
in which participants sketch trajectories. In Sterman and Booth-
Sweeney (2007), a multiple-choice condition with seven textual
response alternatives produced equivalent results to conditions
requiring participants to sketch graphs.
The decision-making component of the CST was executed as
a z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) program, which was administered
on the right computer terminal of each participant’s workstation.
The CST required a decision at two different points in time: T1
and T2. At T1, all participants completed the task individually,
irrespective of the group size condition to which they had
been allocated. The experimental procedure at this time point
was therefore identical across all three group size conditions.
Participants first read the electronic instructions on the left
computer terminal, before indicating on the right computer
terminal which of the four graphs they believed would stabilize
atmospheric CO2 concentration (Figure 2). There was no time
limit for this component of the task.
Once participants had registered their T1 graph choice, a text
field appeared on screen with a prompt to use the keyboard
to type out a brief explanation for why they thought that the
graph they had chosen was correct. Participants were allocated
5minutes to complete this component of the task and a counter
in the top right-hand corner of the terminal display indicated
the time remaining for participants to supply their written
explanations.
At T2, participants were informed of their group size
condition allocation. Participants assigned to the dyads or groups
conditions were required to discuss the decision problem with
their one partner or three group members, respectively, for
a fixed period of 10minutes in order to reach a consensus
decision regarding the correct solution. They were first given
six guidelines for a productive group discussion (adapted from
a study by Schweiger et al., 1986), as shown in Figure 3A.
They then entered an online chatroom in which they could
communicate with one another. The chatroom interface was
divided into two panels: the Player Decisions Panel and the
Communication Panel (Figure 4). The Player Decisions Panel,
to the left of the terminal display, presented the T1 graph
choices and explanations of each group or dyad member under
a pseudonym (Leda, Triton, Portia, or Sinope) to preserve
participant anonymity. In the Communication Panel, to the
right of the terminal display, dyad and group members could
communicate with one another by typing messages into a text
entry field. These messages were posted in the Communication
Panel under the group or dyad member’s designated pseudonym.
A timer in the top right corner of the terminal display showed
how much time remained. After 10minutes had elapsed, one
group or dyad member was chosen randomly by the computer
to register the group’s or dyad’s consensus decision.
The procedure atT2 was different in the individuals condition.
Participants in this condition were instructed to reflect on their
T1 decision for 10minutes, alone. They were instructed to
approach this reflection with a skeptical mind, to question their
original assumptions, and to consider alternative explanations
(Figure 3B). The chatroom interface was once again divided
into two panels, this time labeled the Decision Panel and the
Reflections Panel. In the Decision Panel, to the left of the
terminal display, participants could inspect their T1 decision
and explanation. In the Reflections Panel, to the right of the
terminal display, participants were able to record reflections on
their T1 decision. This panel was essentially the same as the
Communication Panel for participants in the groups and dyads
conditions, except that it was used to record self-reflections,
rather than to communicate with group or dyad members.
A timer in the top right corner of the terminal display once
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FIGURE 3 | The instructions given to participants in the groups and dyads conditions (A) and individuals condition (B) at T2.
again indicated how much time remained. After 10minutes had
elapsed, participants were required to indicate once again which
graph they deemed to be correct.
After submitting the T2 decision, all participants completed
a post-test questionnaire. Participants in the dyads or groups
conditions were asked to choose one of the four CST graphs
again, in response to the question; “If the group answer is not
what you would have chosen, which answer would you have
chosen?”. The post-test questionnaire also contained the climate
change knowledge and attitudes questions asked in the individual
differences questionnaire at the beginning of the experiment.
The CST took approximately 30minutes to complete, and the
entire experimental session lasted approximately 60minutes.
RESULTS
Time 1
The success rates at T1 (blue bars; Figure 5) did not differ
significantly across the three conditions (χ ²df = 2 = 1.72, p= .424,
two-sided), and the overall success rate was 44%. This is
consistent with the highest previously-reported success rate
using the CST (Sterman and Booth-Sweeney, 2002). Table 1
shows the frequency with which participants used various
reasoning strategies at T1 to justify their graph choice. For
example, GraphDwas frequently accompanied by an explanation
correctly describing mass balance principles (88.7% of Graph
D responses). Although other strategies were referenced by
participants who selected Graph D, every other reasoning
strategy was more frequently used to justify an incorrect graph.
The full coding scheme consisted of five strategies from
Sterman and Booth-Sweeney (2007) and their associated
coding criteria, plus four additional categories created post-
hoc to capture reasoning strategies that did not conform to
any previously-defined category. The strategies taken from
Sterman and Booth-Sweeney (2007) were: pattern-matching,
mass balance, technology, sink saturation, and CO2 fertilization
(for details see Table 7 in Sterman and Booth-Sweeney, 2007).
Two additional categories defined in their coding scheme
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FIGURE 4 | Graphical illustration of the chatroom communication interface.
FIGURE 5 | Percentage of correct (Graph D) responses to the CST as a function of time (T1 vs. T2) and condition (individuals vs. dyads vs. groups). The bars for T1
(and T2 for the individuals condition) represent the percentage of correct individual responses, whereas the bars for the dyads and groups conditions at T2 represent
the proportion of correct dyad and group consensus decisions, respectively. Error bars represent standard errors.
(energy balance and inertia/delays) were not used by any
of our participants, and therefore were not included here.
Two of the new categories were simply the reverse of the
categories identified by Sterman and Booth-Sweeney (2007):
mass balance—incorrect (incorrect understandings of mass
balance) and technology—reverse (technology will increase
emissions, rather than enable emissions reduction). The final
two categories, mathematical reasoning, and reasonableness of
trajectories, were created by the authors on the basis of an
analysis of participants’ responses. In this paper, we only report
on the five most popular strategies (technology, sink saturation,
CO2 fertilization, and technology—reverse were used by <3% of
total participants and were therefore excluded from the current
analysis).
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TABLE 1 | The frequency (%) with which different reasoning strategies were adopted, as a function of Graph A, B, C, and D choices at T1.
Reasoning strategy and coding
criteria
Example participant explanation Graph A
(n = 37)
Graph B
(n = 12)
Graph C
(n = 30)
Graph D
(n = 62)
% of
total
Mass Balance (Correct)
Description indicating awareness of
relationship between emissions and
absorption flows and the stock of
atmospheric CO2; terms such as
mass balance, accumulation, rate of
change.
“It’s a mass balance and rates of change situation.
For the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere to
stabilize, you need the rates of emission and
absorption to equal.”
“If emissions are greater than the absorption, the
amount of CO2 will increase. If the absorption is
greater than the emissions, the amount of CO2 will
decrease.”
0.0 0.0 10.0 88.7 41.1
Mass Balance (Incorrect)
Description indicating awareness of
relationship between emissions and
absorption flows and the stock of
atmospheric CO2–but
misunderstanding the nature of these
relationships.
“In figure D, emissions ended up being the same as
absorption, which causes the concentration
reducing to 0.”
“If we keep the same difference between the rate of
emission and absorption, the concentration will be
the same.”
32.4 66.7 56.7 4.8 28.4
Pattern-Matching
Description mentioning correlations or
similarity of behavior or patterns
among emissions and atmospheric
CO2; indication that emissions should
be proportional to changes in
atmospheric CO2.
“As I understand it, there is a direct relationship
between CO2 emissions and the atmospheric
concentration.”
“If atmospheric concentration increases, that means
that CO2 emissions will also increase.”
“[Graph A] because it rises and then stabilizes.”
59.5 33.3 10.0 1.6 21.3
Mathematical Reasoning
Using algebraic equations, calculating
ratios, or quantifying the absolute
values of atmospheric concentration,
emissions, and/or absorption.
“To achieve the quantity of 420 ppm, should have
an increase of 20 ppm. The emission should be only
20% higher than the absorption.”
“The rate of ppm increase from 1990 to 2025 = 120
ppm/125 years = 0.96 ppm/ear. The ratio of GtC to
ppm is around 4GtC = 1ppm.”
21.6 50.0 16.7 8.1 17.0
Reasonableness of Trajectories
Indicates belief that the correct
trajectory should reflect
business-as-usual or personal
predictions about future
emissions/absorption rates.
“…it would be too idealistic to imply that the change
would be immediate and the decline would be as
drastic as depicted in options B, C, and D” “With
current pressures on countries by the UNFCCC for
setting emission reduction targets, countries will
take drastic measures to reduce their carbon
emissions.”
21.6 33.3 20.0 6.5 15.6
Reasoning strategy was inferred from participants’ T1 post-decision explanations. The first column lists the possible reasoning strategies, and the coding criteria for those strategies,
whilst the second column gives example participant explanations that conform to each strategy. The third through sixth columns show the percentage of participants who chose Graph
A, B, C, or D, respectively, and subsequently referenced each reasoning strategy. As any one explanation could refer to more than one reasoning strategy, the values in columns three
through six may sum to >100%. The last column shows the percentage of total responses that referenced each reasoning strategy. Again, this sums to >100% because multiple
strategies were possible. For inter-rater reliability information, see Supplementary Materials, Section Inter-Rater Reliability for Coding of Reasoning Strategies at T1.
The literature tends to attribute incorrect answers on the CST
to the “pattern-matching” heuristic (e.g., Sterman and Booth-
Sweeney, 2007; Sterman, 2008; Cronin et al., 2009). Pattern-
matching was indeed the most popular reasoning strategy for
participants who selected the typical pattern-matching graph of
Graph A (Figure 2A). However, pattern-matching was not the
most popular incorrect reasoning strategy overall. As shown in
the last column of Table 1, across all responses, incorrect mass
balance principles were applied more frequently than pattern-
matching. “Mathematical reasoning” and “reasonableness of
trajectories” were also common, especially for participants who
chose Graph B. The popularity of these strategies suggests that
errors on the CST are not exclusively caused by rash, heuristic
decisions (i.e., pattern-matching)—even participants who used
deliberate and effortful approaches (e.g., unsuccessfully trying to
relate CO2 emissions with CO2 absorption, or calculating ratios)
failed to reach the correct answer.
Time 2
There was more heterogeneity in success rates across conditions
at T2 (orange bars; Figure 5), and the overall success rate of 59%
was marginally higher than at T1. The success rate for dyads
(65.0%) did not differ significantly from that for individuals
(38.1%) (χ ² df=1 = 2.97, p = .121, two-sided) or groups (75.0%)
(χ ² df=1 = 0.48, p = .731, two-sided). However, the success
rate for groups was significantly higher than for individuals
(χ ²df=1 = 5.67, p = .028, two-sided). A more diagnostic set
of comparisons involves contrasting the difference in success
rates between T1 and T2 for each condition, separately. For
individuals, there was no change in success rates over time
(p = 1.00, McNemar, two-sided). For dyads, the success rate of
dyad consensus decisions at T2 (65.0%) was numerically, but
not significantly, higher than that of individual dyad member
decisions at T1 (52.5%) (p = .125, McNemar, two-sided). Recall
that after dyads submitted their consensus decision at T2,
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individual dyad members were prompted for the answer they
would have chosen, regardless of what the consensus decision
was. Again, there was no difference in success rates between
answers given by individual dyad members at T1 and then at this
post-test stage (both 52.5%) (p = 1.00, McNemar, two-sided).
For groups, the success rate of group consensus decisions at T2
(75.0%) was significantly higher than that of individual group
member decisions atT1 (41.3%) (p< .001,McNemar, two-sided).
Furthermore, the success rate of individual groupmembers’ post-
test answers (61.3%) was significantly higher than the success rate
of individual group members at T1 (41.3%) (p= .002, McNemar,
two-sided). Thus, the group discussion reliably improved CST
success rates, while the individual reflection and dyad discussion
did not.
Analysing the content of T2 reflections and discussions (in
the same way as analyzing the content of T1 explanations) sheds
light on how groups derived their decision-making advantage
over individuals. Despite explicit instructions to “approach this
with a skeptical mind,” “question your own assumptions,” and
“consider alternative arguments,” 80% of participants in the
individuals condition did not type anything during the 10-
minute reflection period. Of 21 individuals, only one typed an
alternative argument, and only three changed their answers at
T2. Individuals failed to self-reflect, thus preventing them from
recognizing their answer was incorrect, or considering why a
different answer may be correct. This is consistent with previous
research characterizing individuals as “cognitively lazy” decision-
makers who rarely challenge an answer that “feels” right (Trouche
et al., 2015; Larrick, 2016).
By contrast, all groups entertained at least two reasoning
strategies in their group discussions (except one group in
which all group members selected Graph D at T1). Group
discussions contained a mean of 2.30 different reasoning
strategies, compared to 1.15 for dyad discussions, and 0.24 for
individual reflections (χ ²df=2 = 33.48, p < .001, two-sided).
Furthermore, we have tentative evidence that group members
helped correct other members’ faulty reasoning strategies. For
example, in one group, one participant’s misunderstanding
of mass balance principles (“If emission rate gets close to
absorption, concentration will decrease below 400[ppm]”) was
corrected by two other participants who explained the principle
of accumulation (“. . . but when emissions is greater than
absorption, then concentration will increase”). Groups weremore
likely than individuals (χ ²df=1 = 23.89, p < .001, two-sided)
and dyads (χ ²df=1 = 8.29, p = .010, two-sided) to refer to the
correct reasoning strategy of mass balance (even if no group
member had referenced mass balance in their T1 explanation).
This supports previous findings showing that exposure to diverse
perspectives motivates group members to critically evaluate all
arguments (Trouche et al., 2015), thus increasing the likelihood
that the correct decision will be discussed and judged to be
correct (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006).
The data seem to speak against—but do not rule out—
the alternative explanation that groups only benefited from
the increased probability of having one member who knew
the correct answer. Eight individuals, 15 dyads, and 15 groups
contained at least one member who chose Graph D at T1. If
the effect was due merely to the presence of a correct member,
we would expect equal performance between dyads and groups,
and also for dyads to outperform individuals at T2 (which they
did not, χ ²df=1 = 2.97, p = .121, two-sided). Furthermore, two
groups gave the correct consensus decision at T2, despite having
no members who gave the correct decision at T1 (an example
of “process gain,” in which interpersonal interaction between
multiple individuals yields an outcome better than that of any
single individual, or even the sum of all individuals; Hackman
and Morris, 1975).
We were also able to rule out effects of individual differences.
Binary logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine
whether the various individual difference variables measured at
pre-test subsequently predicted performance on the CST at T1.
To satisfy the assumption of a dichotomous dependent variable,
CST performance was coded as either incorrect (selecting
Graphs A, B, or C) or correct (selecting Graph D). Age,
actively open-minded thinking, and supporting the policy of
“government regulation of CO2 as a pollutant” were the only
significant independent predictors (p< .05). These variables were
subsequently combined into a set of predictors and subjected
to a further binary logistic regression analysis. The full model
was statistically significant compared to the constant-only model,
χ
2
df=3 = 21.47, p < .001, Nagelkerke’s R
2
= 0.19. Prediction
accuracy was 61.9% (50.8% for correct responses, 70.5% for
incorrect responses). Thus, the full model with these three
predictors was barely above chance at predicting correct answers.
This poor predictive performance is noteworthy in revealing that
performance on the CST is largely immune to the influence
of demographic, attitudinal, personality, and cognitive style
variables.
Recall that the individual difference questions about climate
change knowledge and attitudes were presented again at the post-
test phase. CST performance was not significantly predictive of
answers to any of these items. However, in light of the third
aim of our study, it is worth discussing the answers to the
policy preference question, “Which of these comes closest to
your view on how we should address climate change?”. At pre-
test, 69.1% of participants answered “act-now,” 30.9% answered
“go-slow,” and no participant selected the “wait-and-see” option.
Excluding the wait-and-see option, answering the CST correctly
did not significantly predict post-test responses (χ2df=3 = 7.19,
p = .066, two-sided). However, there was an increase in the
percentage of individuals who selected “act-now” from pre-test
to post-test across all conditions (overall, 80.9% “act-now” at
post-test).
DISCUSSION
Repeated studies employing the CST reveal that individuals
systematically underestimate the emissions reduction required to
stabilize atmospheric CO2 levels. So far, interventions to increase
success rates on the CST have been individual-focused and largely
ineffective. We sought to examine whether group reasoning
could increase success rates on this task. It was predicted that
success rates from T1 toT2 would (1) not increase for individuals,
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(2) increase for dyads, and (3) increase for groups to a greater
extent than for dyads. The first and third predictions were
statistically supported, but there was only qualitative support
for the second prediction. The 10-minute group discussions
among four participants significantly improved success rates,
whereas 10minutes of individual reflection or dyad discussion
did not. By analyzing individual justifications at T1, and
reflections and discussions at T2, we found that groups benefited
from exposure to multiple perspectives and the opportunity
to communicate, which facilitated the falsification of incorrect
reasoning strategies. We also found that incorrect reasoning
strategies were numerous, and not limited to the oft-reported
pattern-matching strategy. Lastly, we rejected two alternative
explanations—groups did not improve merely due to a size
advantage in the number of members who knew the correct
response, nor were individual differences in demographics,
climate change knowledge, personality, or cognitive style
responsible for any given individual’s CST success.
There are some potential limitations of the current study that
merit consideration. Firstly, with a minimum of 20 cases in each
condition as units for the statistical analysis, our experiment
may have had insufficient statistical power to detect a significant
improvement in success rates for dyads from T1 to T2. Using
a larger sample size may reveal that the numerical, yet non-
significant, increase in success rates observed with our dyad
members reflects some real benefit of the dyad discussion.
Secondly, the group advantage observed in the current study
was obtained using a multiple-choice response format, which
is different to the conventional CST procedure in which
participants must sketch trajectories of emissions and absorption.
It therefore remains open whether the results reported here
would generalize to an experimental scenario employing this
more complicated response format. It is possible, for example,
that the uncharacteristically low rates of susceptibility to the
pattern matching heuristic observed in the current study are an
artifact of our unorthodox response format. Thus, we may expect
higher initial rates of pattern-matching when returning to the
original CST procedure, but it remains to be seen whether this
would eliminate or attenuate the group advantage witnessed here.
Thirdly, our intervention at T2 in the dyad and group conditions
afforded more than merely the opportunity for individuals to
communicate with one another—participants were also afforded
the chance to read the T1 explanations of their dyad partner
or group members. Although it is our conviction that the
opportunity to engage in communication was instrumental to
the group decision making advantage, we cannot preclude the
possibility that mere exposure to the alternative perspectives of
others may confer an advantage in itself, compared to individual
reasoning alone. A group condition in which participants are
exposed to their group members’ T1 decision explanations—
without engaging in any subsequent discussion—would reveal
whether mere exposure to multiple perspectives can produce
a group benefit. Finally, we could not provide strong evidence
for Sterman’s (2008) argument that policy-makers’ and citizens’
deficient mental models of the climate system are responsible
for complacent attitudes toward emissions reduction. Answers to
the CST did not predict subsequent policy preferences. However,
all participants in our sample believed that we must take action
against climate change (“act-now” or “go-slow”), even before
completing the CST. We were therefore unable to test the
hypothesis that participants who answer the CST incorrectly
also deny the need for emissions reduction (“wait-and-see”).
However, the overall increase in “act-now” responses, relative
to “go-slow” responses, from pre-test to post-test implies some
diffuse benefit of merely completing the CST. Future studies
employing a sample with more heterogeneous pre-existing policy
beliefs will provide a stronger test for the hypothesized link
between accurate mental models of the CO2 system and support
for urgent emissions reduction.
Given the abovementioned concerns about the generality
of our results, one direction for future work is to determine
whether and how our findings generalize to other stock-
flow tasks, especially the original CST procedure, in which
participants sketch trajectories of emissions and absorption by
themselves. Furthermore, although we have shown a benefit on
CST performance of reasoning in groups of four members, an
additional avenue for future work will be to examine whether
this advantage extends to larger groups. On the one hand, we
might expect that increasing the number of group members
will improve CST performance, because of an increase in
information-processing capacity and diversity of perspectives
(Cohen and Thompson, 2011; Charness and Sutter, 2012).
On the other hand, we might expect that as the group size
reaches some critical point, CST performance will begin to
decline as the aforementioned benefits of group decision making
will be outweighed by the costs of coordinating opinions and
resolving disputes within the group (Orlitzky and Hirokawa,
2001; Lejarraga et al., 2014). Identifying the optimal group size
for solving the CST will permit more robust recommendations
about how group-based practices should be incorporated into the
decision-making process.
In closing, we note that the final success rate of group
consensus decisions at T2 (75%) is considerably higher than the
success rates previously reported with the CST. The success of our
group-based intervention suggests that group-based decision-
making may help facilitate the two-step implementation of
effective emissions policy. First, crafting appropriate mitigation
policy requires comprehensive and accurate decision-making,
and our results suggest small groups are best-suited for this
task. Second, rallying political and electoral support for such
policy requires a well-informed population that comprehends
the scale of the emissions problem. The general public presently
endorses high levels of belief in anthropogenic climate change,
but low levels of concern and urgency about climate change
mitigation (Akter and Bennett, 2011; Reser et al., 2012). In
order to bridge this gap between what the public believes
about the climate change problem (that it is real and caused
by human activities), and the solutions they are willing to
support (immediate and significant emissions reduction), their
mental models must be changed. Group-based programs,
whether informal conversations about climate change or formal
public education initiatives, could establish the correct mental
model and help mobilize support for effective mitigation
policy.
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